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introduction
Earnings are the profits of a company. In-
vestors and analysts look at earnings to de-
termine the attractiveness of a company. 
Com panies with poor earnings prospects will 
typi cally have lower share prices than those 
with good prospects. A company’s capability 
to generate profit in the future plays a very 
important role in determining a share’s price. 
Earnings management represents a strategy 
used by the management of a company to 
deliberately manipulate the company’s earn-
ings so that the figures match a pre-deter-
mined target. The purpose of this practice is 
income smoothing. Thereby, rather than hav-
ing years of very good or extremely bad earn-
ings, companies will try to keep the perfor-
mance results relatively stable by adding and 
removing cash from reserve accounts.
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Although the different methods used by 
managers to smooth earnings can be very 
complex and confusing, the important thing 
is that the driving force behind earnings 
management is to meet a pre-specified target. 
As the great investor Warren Buffett once 
said: “Managers that always promise to “make 
the numbers” will at some point be tempted 
to make up the numbers”.
According to [Healy, Wahlen, 1999], “earn-
ings management” occurs when managers 
use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance 
of a company or influence contractual out-
comes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers.
Management wishing to show earnings at 
a certain level or following a certain pattern 
seek loopholes in financial reporting stan-
dards that allow them to adjust the numbers 
as far as is practicable to achieve their de-
sired aim or to satisfy projections by finan-
cial analysts. These adjustments amount to 
fraudulent financial reporting when they fall 
“outside the bounds of acceptable accounting 
practice”. Drivers for such behavior include 
market expectations, personal realization of 
a bonus, and maintenance of position with-
in a market sector. In most cases conformance 
to acceptable accounting practices is a mat-
ter of personal integrity.
There is a variety of forms of earnings 
management. It includes the practices of 
selectively choosing accounting estimates 
and timing operating or investment decisions 
to move reported earnings toward a desired 
goal (see [Schipper, 1989; Merchant, Rock-
ness, 1994; Healy, Wahlen, 1999]). Examples 
of earnings management also include delay-
ing the recognition of expenses to avoid 
violating debt covenants.
Other motives for earnings management 
include maximizing bonus compensation 
[Healy, 1985], meeting analysts’ earnings 
forecasts [Burgstahler, Eames, 1998], and 
trying to achieve protection from foreign 
competitors [Jones, 1991].
A large body of empirical evidence suggests 
that companies adopt several forms of earn-
ings management [Burgstahler, Dichev, 1997; 
Burgstahler, Eames, 1998; Healy, Wahlen, 
1999; Brown, 2001]. For deeper analysis of 
earnings management see also [Cahan, 1992; 
DeFond, Jiambalvo, 1994; Perry, Williams, 
1994; Erickson, Wang, 1999]. At the same 
time [Fischer, Rosenzweig, 1995] found that 
the direction of manipulation (increasing 
earnings or decreasing earnings) is very im-
portant for respondents when studing ethical 
acceptability of earnings management.
Let us start our examples of earnings man-
agement from recent cases in the United 
States America. Bank of America Corp. and 
Citigroup Inc. incorrectly hid from investors 
billions of dollars of their debt, similar to 
what Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. did to 
obscure its level of risk, company documents 
show. In recent filings with regulators, the 
two big banks disclosed that over the past 
three years 2007–2010, they at times errone-
ously classified some short-term repurchase 
agreements, or “repos”, as sales when they 
should have been classified as borrowings. 
Though the transactions involved billions of 
dollars, they represented relatively small 
amounts for the banks. A bankruptcy-court 
examiner had been doing the same thing to 
make its balance sheet look better before it 
filed for bankruptcy in September 2008, us-
ing a strategy dubbed “Repo 105” that helped 
the Wall Street firm move $50 billion in as-
sets off its balance sheet. Bank of America 
and Citigroup say that their misclassifications 
were due to errors — not an attempt to make 
themselves look less risky, which was Leh-
man’s motivation. The disclosures, made af-
ter federal securities regulators began asking 
financial firms about their repo accounting, 
were included in quarterly filings earlier this 
month but not highlighted. The disclosures 
come amid a series of revelations about how 
banks obscure their risk-taking before report-
ing their finances to the public, a practice 
known in the financial world as “window 
dressing”. Bank of America and Citigroup 
were among the banks cited in a page-one 
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Wall Street Journal article detailing how fi-
nancial firms temporarily shed repo debt at 
the ends of quarters, when they report their 
finances to investors. Since the financial cri-
sis began, both banks often have reduced their 
quarter-end repo debt from their average bor-
rowings for the same quarter. That activity 
did not involve misclassifying repo loans as 
sales. Repos are short-term loans that allow 
banks to take higher risks on securities trades. 
Classifying the transactions as sales instead 
of borrowings allows a firm to take assets off 
its balance sheet and thus reduces its report-
ed leverage, or assets as a multiple of equity 
capital. Federal securities rules bar financial 
firms from intentionally masking debt to de-
ceive investors. There is no indication that 
Bank of America or Citigroup misclassified 
their repos intentionally or that the Securities 
and Exchange Commission will take any ac-
tion against them. The misclassifications had 
tiny impacts on the banks’ reported leverage, 
and none at all on their earnings or share-
holder equity. The banks did not restate any 
financial statements. Bank of America said 
the misclassified transactions in certain quar-
ters over the past three years-ranging from 
$573 million to as much as $10,7 billion “rep-
resented substantially less than 1% of our 
total assets” and had no material impact on 
its balance sheet, earnings or borrowing ra-
tios. Ci ti group said the misclassified transac-
tions of $5,7 billion as of the end of 2009, 
and as much as $9,2 billion over the past 
three years involved “a very limited number 
of our business units” that “used this type 
of transaction in very small amounts”. It 
also said its errors were immaterial to its 
financial statements. The SEC had asked big 
banks in March 2010 for more information 
about their repo accounting in the wake of 
the Lehman bankruptcy report. Bank of Ame-
rica and Citigroup indicated they had found 
their errors on their own initiative. More 
broadly, the SEC is now considering stricter 
disclosure and a clearer rationale from firms 
about quarter-end borrowing activities.
In [Armstrong, 1993] author claims that 
earnings management is one of the most im-
portant ethical financial reporting. The role 
of accountants in providing the investors 
with reliable financial information (in the 
form of financial statements) for decision-
making is very high. Differing national per-
ceptions were described in [Meirovich, Rei-
chel, 2000]. They showed that Russian ex-
ecutives believe it is not possible to operate 
in a completely legal manner given the exist-
ing conditions in the country. As a result, 
these managers have employed very creative 
manipulation techniques described as “per-
petually being improved”. Moreover, it was 
stated in [Meirovich, Reichel, 2000] that 
these illustrated perceptions are an out-
growth of the nation’s culture and history. 
So, the authors suggest that national culture 
has a significant impact on the perceived ac-
ceptability of earnings management. This 
study also investigates whether the accept-
ability of earnings management in Russia 
vary across different national cultures.
purpose of the study and hypotheses
Earnings management can be carried out in 
different ways. Modern national and inter-
national accounting standards give managers 
a certain freedom in choosing accounting 
policy. In [Merchant, Rockness, 1994; Fi-
scher, Rosenzweig, 1995] authors suggested 
two forms of earnings management, account-
ing methods and operating methods. Their 
study showed that companies perceive the 
practice of operating manipulations more 
favorable than accounting manipulations. 
Accounting methods allow achieving the fol-
lowing. First, to redistribute the financial 
result of the organization between the report-
ing periods, in other words, the total amount 
of income and expenses for the operation 
remains constant, and only the time of their 
recognition changes. For example, R&D costs 
are divided into research costs and develop-
ment costs. In most national accounting sys-
tems research costs are recognized as ex-
penses of the period at the time of their 
occurrence and development costs are capi-
talized when certain conditions are met. 
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However, if the organization, in particular, 
cannot distinguish the stages of research and 
development, then all costs are considered 
research costs. It follows that the organiza-
tion can either relate all expenses for the 
current period, or capitalize part of the costs 
related to the development stage, thereby 
increasing the current financial result.
Secondly, the choice of these or other 
methods and instruments allows to redistrib-
ute income and expenses between operation-
al and others. Thus, it is possible to improve 
the financial result from the main activity. 
For example, by choosing how to write off 
interest on loans for other operating expens-
es you can increase the gross pro fit compared 
to using the method of capitalization of bor-
rowing costs. Operating me thods involve the 
real implementation of so-called “necessary” 
operations. The need to accomplish the op-
eration is not caused by the economic need 
but solely with a goal to manage financial 
reports. The traditional tool of this method 
is the sale of an asset with income followed 
by its return purchase or lease.
This research was motivated by several 
considerations. First, in spite of the effects 
of internal corporate governance in develop-
ing countries, Russian corporate governance 
mechanisms may be less effective due to 
several factors, such as insufficient inde-
pendence of directors and ownership con-
centration. Second, Russia has similar fac-
tors to other developing countries such as 
low investor rights, inactive regulations and 
opacity of higher-level earnings manage-
ment. Finally, previous studies have inves-
tigated earnings management practices in 
different legal environments and economies; 
however, the Russian environment has not 
yet been the subject of academic studies, 
which would play a significant role in im-
proving perception of earnings management.
Thus, the main purpose of this study was 
to assess the attitudes on the ethical accept-
ability of earnings management of Russian 
respondents and to compare these results 
with the other countries based on the re-
search data of [Geiger et al., 2006]. Since 
this study follows a deductive methodology, 
primary hypotheses was formulated simi-
larly to the above-mentioned studies.
H1. Russian companies perceive the prac-
tice of operating manipulations more fa-
vorable than accounting manipulations.
H2. Russian companies perceive more 
favorable manipulations with income rath-
er than with expenses.
methodology
This study was undertaken in two phases: 
(1) a questionnaire survey and (2) data anal-
ysis.
Data were collected through the use of 
a questionnaire. The respondents in the 
study were asked to evaluate the ethical ac-
ceptability of 13 earnings management ac-
tivities taken by a hypothetical profit center 
manager by indicating their judgment using 
the following scale:
1) ethical practice;
2) questionable practice. I would not say 
anything to the manager, but it makes 
me uncomfortable;
3) minor infraction. The manager should be 
warned not to do it again;
4) serious infraction. The manager should 
be severely reprimanded;
5) totally unethical. The manager should be 
fired.
The thirteen earnings management questions 
borrowed from [Geiger et al., 2006] are list-
ed in the Appendix. The research uses the 
general logic of [Bruns, Merchant, 1990; Mer-
chant, Rockness, 1994; Fischer, Rosen zweig, 
1995] to analyze the perception of respon-
dents regarding the practices of earnings 
management. Like the [Merchant, Rock ness, 
1994] the 5-point scale ranging from 1 for 
“ethical practice” to 5 for “totally unethical 
practice” is used. The higher scores in the 
scale indicate that individuals perceived the 
proposed action as less ethical.
The original 13 earnings management 
questions can be grouped by the following 
forms and factors (table 1). Earnings can be 
manipulated in two broad ways. First, man-
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agers could alter the recording of existing 
transactions (this way refers to accounting 
method). Second, managers could resort to 
timing operating activities near year-end to 
move revenues and expenses into desired 
periods (it refers to operating method). The 
example of an operating method in the used 
questionnaire is the question 2 (manager 
orders his employees to defer discretionary 
expenditures until the next accounting pe-
riod). Question 6 in which the manager ma-
nipulates his division’s inventory reserve is 
an example of an accounting method.
To analyze differences in means between 
the constructed groups of earnings manage-
ment questions the simple t-test was used.
Respondents
The study includes a sample of Russian in-
dustrial and retail companies with location 
in Central part of Russia, Ural and Siberia 
over a period of five years between 2007 and 
2012. In total 150 questionnaires were dis-
tributed, of which 13 were not fully com-
pleted and therefore were not taken into ac-
count when processing the results. Among 
137 respondents in this study there were 51% 
of women and 49% of men. Participation was 
voluntary and anonymous. For the purposes 
of the comparative analysis, the total number 
of companies for this study was chosen by 
analogy with the sample sizes of previous 
studies [Merchant, Rockness, 1994; Fischer, 
Rosenzweig, 1995; Geiger et al., 2006].
The sample was formed according to two 
criteria: (1) the annual revenue is not less 
than 1 billion rubles; (2) number of employ-
ees is not less than 1 thousand employees. 
The sample of Russian industrial and retail 
companies represents nine industries: pow-
er engineering, metal industry, machine 
building, trade, construction, chemical in-
dustry, oil and gas industry, transport, pulp 
and paper industry.
The three groups of respondents are list-
ed in the table 2.
In our sample 129 (94%) respondents 
have high professional education, 5 (4%) 
respondents have a science degree and only 
3 respondents (2%) have only secondary 
education. Overall median age for all re-
spondents is 40 years.
results
Table 3 shows the mean scores and standard 
deviations for the responses of the entire set 
of 137 Russian respondents for each of the 
13 questions grouped by factors on which 
they loaded highly.
Table 1
types of earnings management questions
forms of earnings management factor Question
Accounting method Inventory manipulation 5b. Write-down inventory
6а. Write-up inventory — product development
6b. Write-up inventory — meet budget
Accrual manipulation 3. Record supplies next year
5а. Prepay travel expenses
7а. Delay recording invoice — $30 000
7b. Delay recording invoice — $500 000
Operating method Operating expenses 1. Paint building early
2а. Defer expenditures for quarter
2b. Defer expenditures for year
Operating revenue 4а. End of year sales program
4b. Overtime in December
4c. Sell unused assets
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The first two lines of table 4 compare the 
mean scores for the questions describing ac-
counting methods of managing earnings with 
those describing operating methods. It shows 
a difference; the accounting methods were 
judged much more strictly than operating 
methods. The last two lines of table 4 show 
that the actions which increased earnings 
were not rated significantly different from 
those which decreased earnings.
Thus hypothesis H1 is supported. The 
results obtained correspond with findings 
by [Bruns, Merchant, 1990; Fischer, Rosen-
zweig, 1995] and confirm that three surveyed 
groups (general managers & business owners; 
operating-unit controllers; corporate staff) 
show a greater tolerance for operating ma-
nipulation than for accounting manipulation. 
In Russia managers often think of ethics as 
Table 2
classification of respondents
group Job experience, years number of respondents share, %
General managers, business owner’s 5,5  64  47
Operating-unit controllers 4,6  51  37
Corporate staff 3,9  22  16
In total 137 100
Table 3
mean scores of earnings management variables, grouped by factors
forms 
of  earnings 
management
factor Question mean std dev.
mean of 
factor
std dev. 
of factor
Accounting 
method
Inventory 
manipula-
tion
5b. Write-down inventory 3,27 1,18 2,91 1,23
6а. Write-up inventory — product development 2,79 1,23
6b. Write-up inventory — meet budget 2,68 1,28
Accrual 
manipula-
tion
3. Record supplies next year 2,95 1,09 2,58 1,20
5а. Prepay travel expenses 2,60 1,30
7а. Delay recording invoice — $30 000 1,99 1,03
7b. Delay recording invoice — $500 000 2,79 1,37
Operating 
method
Operating 
revenue
4а. End of year sales program 2,63 1,26 2,21 1,14
4b. Overtime in December 2,01 1,16
4c. Sell unused assets 2,00 1,01
Operating 
expenses
1. Paint building early 1,95 1,21 2,11 1,15
2а. Defer expenditures for quarter 1,72 1.07
2b. Defer expenditures for year 2,65 1.16
a list of rules. The widespread logic is that 
if something is not directly prohibited then 
ethics rules are not violated.
Hypothesis H2 is not supported. Direction 
of manipulation (increasing earnings or de-
creasing earnings) is not important for Rus-
sian respondents. In this part there is a 
slight difference from the results obtained 
by Fisher & Rosenzweig. In their study re-
spondents perceive more favorable manipu-
lations with income rather than with ex-
penses.
Table 5 indicates the mean scores to each 
of the 13 earnings management questions 
by country including Russia. For compara-
tive analysis we used the data of [Geiger et 
al., 2006].
Table 5 shows that the 5 earnings man-
agement questions (1, 2a, 2b, 7a, 7b) were 
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Table 4
mean scores of earnings management 
variables, grouped by two attributes
attribute Question
mean
(std 
dev.)
t-sta-
tistic
h1/h2 
support
Account-
ing  
method
3, 5а, 5b, 
6а, 6b, 
7а, 7b
2,75
(1,21)
t = 3,20
р < 0,01
Yes
Operating 
method
1, 2а, 2b, 
4а, 4б, 4c
2,16
(1,14)
Increases 
earnings
2а, 2b, 3, 
4а, 4b, 
4c, 6а, 
6b, 7а, 7b
2,42
(1,17)
t = 0,97 No
Decreases 
earnings
1, 5а, 5b 2,60
(1,23)
valued by Russian respondents as less ethi-
cally troubling than by respondents from 
other eight countries.
Table 6 in its turn obviously demonstrates 
that Russia is the most tolerant country to 
accounting methods of earning management. 
However from the table 7 we can see that as 
to operational methods Russia is not sepa-
rated from other eight countries considered.
conclusion
Financial reporting is an instrument of dia-
logue of management of the companies with 
an external world. In some cases the manage-
ment has an aspiration to reflect in the pub-
lished financial reports the results which are 
distinct from realities of an economic situ-
ation in the company. According to statisti-
cal data in the USA for 2003 as a result of 
swindle in the financial reporting the cumu-
lative damage, put to its users, has made 
$660 billion [Alexander, Britton, Jorissen, 
2005]. At today’s market the value of the 
company is determined basically in a trading 
hall of a stock exchange. Investors, market 
analysts, and also shareholders — all of 
them are interested in the future company 
potential. One of the basic problems, with 
which they now collide, is that the compa-
nies consider the annual report as certain 
type of “goods”. There are special structur-
al divisions in the companies involved in 
preparation of the annual reports and all of 
them aspire to letting out something gloss-
ier than their competitors.
This research has confirmed the hypoth-
eses only partially. Therefore it is possible to 
draw a conclusion that the market system 
dynamically develops in Russia. Distinctions 
Table 5
average scores of earnings management questions: differences across countries
Question usa spain australia indonesia hong Kong malaysia singapore united Kingdom russia
1 1,14 1,48 1,26 1,61 1,36 1,64 1,20 1,20 1,95
2а 2,88 2,80 2,69 2,82 2,51 2,95 3,05 2,75 1,72
2b 3,49 3,39 3,06 3,18 3,00 3,27 3,50 3,16 2,65
3 3,24 3,48 3,10 3,32 2,85 3,14 3,15 2,86 2,95
4а 2,05 2,17 1,89 2,96 2,08 2,00 2,65 1,88 2,63
4b 1,74 2,25 1,78 2,21 1,95 1,86 1,75 1,94 2,01
4c 1,70 2,68 1,84 2,18 2,00 1,95 2,20 1,53 2,00
5а 2,66 2,79 2,71 2,86 2,85 2,77 3,25 2,41 2,60
5b 3,24 3,30 3,07 2,64 2,92 2,82 3,25 3,17 3,27
6а 2,66 2,85 2,61 2,43 2,46 2,50 2,45 2,27 2,79
6b 3,25 3,15 2,84 2,79 2,54 2,50 2,70 2,76 2,68
7а 2,86 2,97 2,54 2,75 2,87 2,68 2,65 2,57 1,99
7b 3,83 3,93 3,42 3,79 3,44 3,41 3,80 3,39 2,79
560 Y. S. Leevik
RMJ 15 (4): 553–562 (2017)
in ethics of acceptance of management deci-
sions in comparison with other developed 
countries gradually disappear. Influence of 
cultural features of socialism epoch has no-
ticeably weakened. Today it is impossible to 
approve that Russia is the country with a 
marginal level of a collectivism and a high 
distance of authority. New businessmen and 
managers are people having modern formation 
in the field of the management. They are ready 
to state professional judgement, to defend it 
and to bear for it the responsibility.
However for contemporary Russia there 
is still no exact statistics about unfair ma-
nipulations in the financial reporting and 
ways of their detection. Considering that in 
Russian companies the reporting under the 
international standards actively takes root 
it is necessary to expect very similar ten-
dencies as in the world practice.
Table 6
average scores for earnings management 
practices: differences across countries 
(accounting methods)
country score
Spain 3,21
USA 3,10
Singapore 3,04
Indonesia 2,94
Australia 2,90
Hong Kong 2,85
Malaysia 2,83
United Kingdom 2,78
Russia 2,75
Table 7
average scores for earnings management 
practices: differences across countries 
(operating methods)
country score
Indonesia 2,49
Spain 2,46
Singapore 2,39
Malaysia 2,28
USA 2,17
Russia 2,16
Hong Kong 2,15
Australia 2,09
United Kingdom 2,08
Appendix1
Instructions
The following questions reflect everyday ethical choices. Please evaluate the practices as they apply to 
a major division (annual revenues of, say, $100 million) of a billion dollar public company. Use the 
following scale to indicate how you judge their acceptability:
1) ethical practice;
2) questionable practice. I would not say anything to the manager, but it makes me uncomfortable;
3) minor infraction. The manager should be warned not to do it again;
4) serious infraction. The manager should be severely reprimanded;
5) totally unethical. The manager should be fired.
Questions
1.  The division’s headquarters building was scheduled to be painted in 2008. But since profit perfor-
mance was way ahead of budget in 2007, the di vision general manager (GM) decided to have the 
work done in 2007. Amount: $150 000.
2. The GM ordered his employees to defer all discretionary expenditures (e. g., travel, advertising, hir-
ing, maintenance) into the next accounting period, so his division could make its budgeted profit 
targets. Expected amount of deferrals: $150 000.
(a) The expenses were postponed from February and March until April in order to make the first 
quarter target.
1 We follow [Geiger et al., 2006] for the sake of compatibility of the results.
561Earnings management in Russian companies: professional ethics of operating decisions
RMJ 15 (4): 553–562 (2017)
(b) The expenses were postponed from November to December until January in order to make the 
annual target.
3. On December 15, a clerk ordered $3000 of office supplies, and the supplies were delivered on 
December 29. This order was a mistake because the GM had ordered that no discretionary expenses 
be incurred for the remainder of the fiscal year, and the supplies were not urgently needed. The 
company’s accounting policy manual states that office supplies are to be recorded as an expense 
when delivered. The GM learned what had happened, and to correct the mistake, he asked the ac-
counting department not to record the invoice until February.
4. In September, the GM realized the division would need strong performance in the fourth quarter 
to reach its budget targets.
(a) He decided to implement a sales program offering liberal payment terms to pull some sales that 
would normally occur next year into the current year; customers accepting delivery in the fourth 
quarter would not have to pay the invoice for 120 days.
(b) He ordered manufacturing to work overtime in December so that everything possible could be 
shipped by the end of the year.
(c) He sold some excess assets and realized profit of $40 000.
5. At the beginning of December 2007, the GM realized that the division would exceed its budgeted 
profit targets for the year.
(a) He ordered his controller to prepay some expenses (e. g., hotel rooms, exhibit expense) for a 
major trade show to be held in March 2008 and to book them as 2007 expenses. Amount: $60 000.
(b) He ordered his controller to develop the rationale for increasing the reserve for inventory obso-
lescence. By taking a pessimistic view of future market prospects, the controller was able to 
identify $700 000 worth of finished goods that conservative accounting would say should be 
fully reserved (i. e., written off), even though the GM was fairly confident that the inventory 
would still be sold at a later date at close to full price.
6. The next year, the division sold 70% of the written-off inventory, and a customer had indicated 
some interest in buying the rest of that inventory the following year. The GM ordered his control-
ler to prepare the rationale for reducing the reserve for obsolescence by $210 000 (i. e., writing up 
the previously written-off goods to full cost). The GM’s mo tivation for recapturing the profit was:
(a) delayed due to budget constraints;
(b) to make budgeted profit targets.
7. In November 2007, the division was straining to meet budget. The GM called the engagement part-
ner of a consulting firm that was doing some work for the division and asked that the firm not send 
an invoice until next year. The partner agreed. Estimated work done but not invoiced:
(a) $30 000;
(b) $500 000.
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Управление прибылью в российских компаниях: профессиональная этика 
операционных решений
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Проблема управления прибылью одна из наиболее актуальных в практике бухгалтерского учета 
во всем мире. Этому есть множество объяснений. В данной статье мы следуем подходу работ 
[Fischer, Rosenzweig, 1995; Geiger et al., 2006] и представляем результаты опроса российских 
респондентов об их отношении к этической приемлемости управления прибылью. Поведение 
российских респондентов отличается от других стран, в которых проводился подобный опрос. 
В статье отмечены факторы, связанные с этими различиями. В то же время было обнаружено, 
что Россия не сильно отличается в восприятии управления прибылью от рыночно ориентирован-
ных стран с развитой экономикой.
Ключевые слова: управление прибылью, деловая этика, финансовая отчетность, бухгалтерский 
учет, начисления.
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